The assurance argument that a trusted 
Introduction
A convincing argument, called an assurance argument, must be made that a trusted system is trustworthy. ' The assurance argument supports the accreditation decision to allow a computer to process classified information in an operational environment. The argument is composed from technical evidence that is produced during the system development process, e.g., the security model, design specifications, proofs, vulnera.bility analysis and test results. As the trust in a system increases, the demand for rigor in the system's assurance argument also increases [5, 231 . However, increasing the rigor of an argument does not necessarily make it more convincing. Assurance is achieved through understanding, specifically the understanding of parties independent of the development effort, i.e., the certifiers. Rigorously produced evidence that is difficult to understand con- cpayne@sctc..com tributes little to assurance [19] . Ricky Butler notes that formal methods can help us demonstrate that an implementation satisfies its specification, but ultimately we must validate that the specification describes what was intended [4] . The assurance argument must help the certifier understand why the specification is accurate (validation) aind why the implementation satisfies the specification (verification). The success of an assurance argument, therefore, depends as much on its presentation as 011 its production.
We have developed and demionstrated an assurance argument documentation approach that improves the readability of the assurance argument while maintaining its consistency with formal specifications that are input to specification and verification systems. Our approach relies on a new application of old technology. Over a decade ago, Donald Knuth introduced the concept of literate programming (LP) for improving the readability and comprehension of computer programs [ll] . He believes that programs should be written to be read by humans instead of computers. Since then, others have extended the application of LP techniques to program design languages [3] , formal specification languages [32], and formal proofs [30]. We propose here that LP techniques can be used to document the entire assurance argument. This paper describes our approach for documenting a formal assurance argument using LP techniques. In the next section, we discuss some problems that may be encountered when documenting a formal assurance argument. Then, we review the LP paradigm in the context of available tools and describe how we used LP techniques to document an assurance argument for a small example. We conclude vvith some lessons learned from that effort and an overview of the primary benefit that accrues from using our approach. An appendix to the paper presents an excerpt from the assurance argument for the example described.
Understanding the! Problem
A few years ago we constructed a formal assurance arument for a highly trusted network security device f 251. Our chain of reasoning spanned from the critical requirements model to source code that was verified to conform to the model. The argument was constructed using a specification language for composite (concurrent) systems, a specification language and verification system for the refinement of sequential components, and a sequential programminglanguage. Assurance evidence produced included machine-generated and manual proofs, a hand-translation from the composite system specification to the sequential component specification, a hand-translation from the sequential component specification to the programming language, and rigorous functional testing. In addition, we modeled graphically the functional behavior of the device. We presented each piece of evidence to the certifier, and we described verbally the connections between them. Unfortunately, the rigor of the assurance argument for the network security device did not significantly improve the certifier's confidence that the critical requirements model was accurate nor that the system, as implemented, conformed to the model. Much of the argument's power to persuade was lost for the following reasons:
T h e f r a m e w o r k for t h e assurance a r g u m e n t w a s n o t d o c u m e n t e d adequately.
An accurate understanding of the argument requires that the framework specify underlying assumptions, motivations and strategies within the context of the system's specification. Significant results of the argument need to be highlighted, and meaningful threads between different pieces of evidence need to be traced. The framework must clearly specify how each piece of evidence contributes to the overall argument. This is particularly important in the development of non-trivial systems that rely on several formal methods, each of which makes certain (possibly contradictory) assumptions about the system being specified. A good framework ensures the cohesion of the argument.
T h e specifications a n d proofs w e r e d o c u m e n t e d in a m a n n e r t o facilitate acceptance by m e c h a n i c a l tools r a t h e r t h a n to p r o m o t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g by hum a n s .
Since the mechanical tools lack many of the reasoning and inference capabilities of a human reader, more information was needed to facilitate verification, e.g., proof heuristics. This extra information can be a substantial obstacle to comprehension. In addition, computer language compilers often restrict the ordering of the individual parts of the specification, e.g., requiring that subroutines be defined before they are called. Unfortunately, the order required by the compiler may not be the most intuitive for the human reviewer. Methods are needed to help manage specification detail by guiding the reader through the specification, pointing out areas of particular interest and hiding obvious or extraneous detail.
L i t t l e assurance w a s provided t h a t t h e d o c u m e nt a t i o n accurately represents t h e s y s t e m a s implem e n t e d .
The assurance argument for the network security device was partitioned into system requirements, module interfaces and module implementation documentation. Documents were kept consistent with the formal specification and code manually; any change to the specification or code required a change to the documentation. This approach is both labor-intensive and error-prone and does not promote confidence in the running system. Any certification of a system must be based on documentation that incontrovertibly describes the system executables.
The problems with certifying the network security device suggested the need for tools and techniques to improve the presentation of an assurance argument without sacrificing its rigor. WEB tools process text files in two independent phases. In the tangle phase, the computer code is extracted and re-ordered for the programming language compiler. In the w e a v e phase, the macros are cross-referenced, program variables are indexed and typesetting commands are added to the code and to the descriptive narrative. Figure 1 illustrates that the results of these phases, after processing by a compiler and a typesetter, are executable code and typeset documentation, respectively. 
Literate Programming (LP)

This macro is invoked in dennilion 1
Let us turn our atlention U, the main algorithm for printing these numbers.
For this example, we will cmshuct a This macro is invoked in definition 2.
[The example continues ... I Figure 3 : Sample LP macros
Knuth notes several benefits of LP [14]:
0 There is no need to choose between top-down and bottom-up programming, because a program is treated as a web instead of a tree. A hierarchical structure is present, but the most important characteristic of the program is its structural relationships. A complex piece of software consists of simple parts and simple relationships between these parts. The programmer's task is to state 2Note that the numbers in square brackets in the figure are not bibliographic references, but macro definition numbers. These numbers appear only after macro definitions or references, i.e., the angle bracket delimited items, and so should not cause confusion with numbers in square brackets that denote bibliographic entries elsewhere in the document.
those parts and their relationships in whatever order is best for the reader. The character repeater, illustrated in Figure 4 , relays only even parity characters until it overflows. More specifically, the repeater has an input port, an output port, and an error port that can operate at a range of speeds. Characters of even parity received over the input port are stored in an internal buffer prior to their transmission over the output port. Characters of odd parity cause an error to be signaled over the error port and are discarded. If the internal buffer overflows, an error is signaled to the error port, all characters in the buffer are transmitted, and the repeater halts. The repeater must satisfy the following critical requirements:
A Simple Application of LP observe t h e influence that LP has on our specification 0 Exactly those characters of even parity received by the repeater prior to the reception of the character causing an overflow are transmitted.
0 Only received characters are transmitted.
0 Characters are transmitted in the order in which they were received. The development and documentation of the repeater assurance argument involved the use of a number of languages and tools. The CSP language [lo] is the computational framework for the repeater specification and verification. The EVES Verification System [6, Figure 5 illustrates the structure of the assurance argument for the repeater CSP process implementation.
Slanted arrows indicate a refinement of a specification to a more detailed specification or implementation; vertical arrows indicate a translataon of a specification from one semantic domain to a comparable semantic domain. Dashed arrows indicate a refinement/translation that is znformal; solid arrows indicate a refinement that uses a combination of anformal and formal techniques. The increase in width of the argument from top to bottom illustrates additional detail that is specified at the lower levels. The translation in the middle of the figure is necessary because FDR lacks the power to analyze the top-level critical requirernents directly. We used EVES to refine the top-level critical requirements to a semantic level that FDR can handle; then we translated the specification into FDR's syntax.
The repeater assurance argument was successfully completed. It is documented as a single coherent entity, from the top-level problem description to the detailed physical design [22] . It describes in detail not only the major components of the assurance argument shown in Figure 5 , but also the transition between these components. Figure 6 illustrates how Funnelweb was used to document the argument. FunnelWeb allowsr tangling both EVES specification files (those ending with [W') and FDR specification files (those ending with The repeater problem has several qualities that made it a good choice for our investigation: it is simple, selfcontained and well-understood . This allowed us to concentrate on the use of LP techniques to develop and explicate its assurance argument with minimal overhead in actually implementing the repeater itself. Unfortunately, it makes it more difficult to argue that the techniques scale-up to larger, more complex application. Nevertheless, the refinement of the repeater addresses many important issues that commonly arise in the development of more complex hardware/software systems: repeater's actual requirements than that allowed by many verification systems, especially symbolic model checkers.
to conform to the logical design using FDFL3 Being able to specify multiple levels of abstraction in the design process is critical to managing the verification of complex systems.
0 Dealing Explicitly with Concurrency: The repeater is specified as a composition of communicating, sequential processes executing concurrently. A method described in [20] was used to derive requirements for the sequential processes sufficient to guarantee that the composite process satisfies its specification. Dealing with concurrency explicitly allowed us to uncover potential problems with the implementation (e.g., synchronization problems) that models based on a single sequential state machine might gloss over.
Specifying Both the Logical and Physical
Design: The decomposition of the repeater into communicating sequential processes was first specified and verified as a logical design (in EVES) and then translated to a physical design (in FDR). The logical design describes a simple abstraction of the repeater (as two processes executing in parallel) that is shown to enforce trace specifications of its critical requirements using EVES. The physical design implements the abstract specification as three processes executing concurrently; it is shown By explicitly addressing these three issues we demonstrate the potential scalability of our approach. The resulting assurance argument is 130 pages, divided into four parts containing thirteen chapters, with three appendices, an index and a bibliography. The four parts are the repeater's problem statement, the logical design, the physical design, and supporting definitions. Each part cont,ains one or more chapters. For example, Part IV contains several chapters consisting of selected definitions from the underlying theories of the specification. The only definitions presented are those considered necessary to understand the specification. The theories from which the definitions are extracted are defined in separate documents that accompany the argument. The length and complexity of the argument is primarily due to our goal of addressing issues that would have to be dealt with in larger-scale applications, as described above. Nevertheless, the length of the assurance ev- idence can be intimidating. The EVES specific,ation and its supporting theories span ninety pages not including the narrative description. Fortunately, only a small fraction of this information needs to be understood to comprehend the assurance argument, and LP tools permit extracting just those elements.
Lessons Learned
Our trial application of LP techniques to the RS-232
repeater assurance argument suggests several lessons to keep in mind when applying the approach in the future:
Adopt tutorzal applacataon of L P t o ease cerdaficatzon.
Documentation that successfully supports system development and maintenance must allow users to locate efficiently the elements of the system specification that they need. Documentation that successfully supports certification must convince readers that the system satisfies its critical requirements. Unfortunately, conventional approaches to documenting systems often requires one to sacrifice ease of understanding for ease of reference.
However, when applied to system specifications, LP tools and techniques permit the user to construct two views of the specification -one produced as a result of the weave phase and one as a result of the tangle phase. The literate program produced as a result of the weave phase should be written as a tutorial explication of the assurance argument to facilitate certification. Divide and conquer strategies for presenting the specification should promote reader comprehension. The specification produced as a result of the tangle phase should be written as a referential guide to the specification. Of course, the tangled output needs to be structured as required for processing by automated tools, but these constraints usually leave room for organizing the specification to improve accessibility. For example, the EVES theories that support the repeater assurance argument are modularized and indexed for ease of reference.
Do not use L P tools too early in the developmewt.
The early stages of writing specifications for ease of understanding and verification involve a discovery period as the author experiments with different abstractions, e.g., specification models and data structures, in the search for the optimal solution. We tliscovered that the use of LP tools during this period interferes with the discovery process. More specifically, the slightly extended development process introduced by the tangle phase obstructs the trial and error nature of discovery. The general approach we adopted was to use the specification and verification tools without LP until the specification begins to stablize. As the author becomes comfortable with the specification, documenting the solution in terms that are intuitive to a reader may proceed using LF' tools.
Simplified document maintenance justifies increased turnaround time.
The document describing the assurance argument necessarily involves many elements of the system specification. Maintaining the consistency of the argument with the actual system specification (as input to the specification and verification tools) is critical to the certification. Unfortunately, the natural evolution of the specification during both development and maintenance phases makes maintaining this consistency difficult even if the developer waits until the specification stablizes before beginning to document the argument. The common approach of maintaining this consistency manually is both time consurrting and error-prone. LP techniques maintain consistency as a matter of course since both the argument and the specification are generated from a single source file. The price for this is an extended development process, which increases the time it takes to process changes to the specification. Nevertheless, the benefits of the LP approach in terms of simplified document maintenance significantly outweighs the disadvantages associated with increased turnaround time.
LP techniques support integratzng formal and informal arguments.
A larger percentage of the repeater's assurance argument than expected was not amenable to formalization. Most of the argument's informality was due to assumptions that the CSP computational paradigm makes about the environment and implementation of CSP processes. These assumptions imply new critical requirements for the repeater that cannot be stated formally in the CSP model and must be verified informally. Tracing both formallly and informally stated critical requirements through the levels of specification refinement is crucial to the cohesion of the assurance argument. The LP techniques and tools provided critical support for interleaving the informal and formal traces of requirements. We believe that the degree of informality of the repeater's argument was not peculiar to the repeater problem, but typical of nontrivial systems in general.
Document only high-level structure of machinegenerated proofs.
Documenting a rigorous assurance argument requires deciding how best to present machine-generated proofs. Even sophisticated provers like EVES do not generate journal-level proofs. If cost were no issue, the ideal approach would be to provide intuitive descriptions of both the formal and informal parts of the assurance arguments. For the repeater argument, we chose a middle road: we provide an intuitive description of the informal parts and carefully outline the boundary of the formal parts. The boundary of the formal parts of the repeater assurance argument was documented by describing only the high-level structure of the formal proofs, omitting the details about why the pi*oofs hold. This approach permits covering all aspects of the argument once in detail and permits assessing the completeness of the argument. Unfortunately, it assumes the proof tools are sound, i.e., they cannot generate a proof of a false conjecture. Although proof tools are relatively reliable, tools that would help certifiers review the proofs produced by proof assistants would reduce the chances of basing an assurance argument on a false machinegenerated proof.
Do not use LP tools as typesetters.
Many of the LP tools, including Funnelweb, follow Knuth's original philosophy of providing enough LPspecific document formatting commands to produce nice documentation. The goal is to make knowledge of the underlying typesetter unnecessary to use LP tools.
As the refinement of the repeater's assurance argument progressed, however, it became clear that the FunnelWeb formatting commands were insufficient by themselves to produce the documentation desired. Rather than mixing UTEX and Funnelweb formatting commands, we restructured the document using FunnelWeb's commands only for defining macros. All other document formatting was specified in I~TEX. This approach simplified tmhe document construction process considerably.
Constructing assurance arguments requares increased support for referencing macros.
An assurance argument involves describing the relationships between entities of the specification and implementation in a more complicated way than that required for traditional literate programming. In particular, we found that Funnelweb, when applied to assurance argument development , does not adequately support referencing macros. We often wanted to reference a macro definition by its name and definition number or to expand it "in-line" in the narrative (i.e., the non-code portion of the document). Because these references occur outside of a macro definition, FunnelWeb simply ignores them during the tangle and weave phases. Other members of the WEB family of tools may support such referencing and should be reviewed for future applications of LP to construct assurance arguments.
Methods are needed t o integrate tools with LP.
While LP tools provide a useful function, they cannot, nor should they be expected to, provide all of the functions needed to document high assurance systems. For example, tools are needed to help trace both formally and informally specified requirements through the levels of refinement and for analyzing these traces for consistency and completeness. Other tools such as prettyprinters, proof review tools, graphical specification and simulation tools, and WYSIWYG editors could significantly facilitate the documentation and certification efforts. Methods are needed to organize and integrate such tools to best support the development of high assurance systems. 6 
Conclusions
Our experience demonstrates the potential benefit of using LP tools and techniques in the development of understandable assurance arguments. In fact, the benefit of using LP to develop assurance arguments for trusted systems that require independent certification exceeds the benefit of using LP for traditional programming. The inevitable use of many different methods, both formal and informal, in the development of the assurance argument requires their application to be documented in a common framework to ensure coherence and readability. LP tools allow this framework to be constructed while maintaining its consistency with formal specifications that are input to specification and verification systems. This approach is more effort than documenting only the individual specifications, but it yields a more cohesive assurance argument and provides certifiers assurance that the running system conforms to its documentation. The simple application of LP described in this paper is only a single case study, but the approach appears promising. We believe that its use would have prevented many of the problems that we encountered in the certification of the network security device [25] . Currently, we are using LP techniques in a larger scale, multi-member team development of a secure functional extension of the Navy's Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) [$] . We have defined the overall functional requirements and operation formally in the langauges of Statemate [9] . The Statemate specification provides a formal structure for the overall system assurance strategy and argument, which is being documented in hypertext (HTML). The refinement of this assurance argument for a security-critical component of the extended JMCIS architecture using EVES and Funnelweb is underway. The user community for LP tools is still very small, even after a decade of use. LP tools have not been commercialized (most are available free over the internet) and, thus, support is haphazard, at best. We hope that the benefit that accrues with the new application of LP described in this paper will revitalize the user community and stimulate commercial investment in the technology.
[ 
A Excerpt from Assurance Argument
This chapter specifies the critical requirements for a CSP process called Rptr that represents the r e~e a t e r .~
Specification of the Formal Assertions
The CSP process Rptr has three parameters, which are constant for any particular instantiation of Rptr:
0 chsz represents the length in bits of a character processed. All characters processed by Rptr are delimited by a s t a r t b i t l s t o p b i t combination.
0 buff sz represents the capacity in characters of the internal buffer.
e t i c k represents the event representing successful termination. We use the variable t i c k , by convention, to represent a special event that occurs automatically when (and only when) a process terminates successfully. Rptr terminates successfully after it halts due to receiving a character that causes an overflow; otherwise, Rptr continues to process characters that it receives. Although a thorough understanding of this example requires familiarity with CSP and EVES, the reader should be able to get a feel for the flow of an assurance argument using LP. See [22] for the complete repeater assurance argument, including an overview of the languages of CSP and EVES.
Top-Level Requirements Structure
Our goal is to specify formally as trace specifications the critical requirements for R~t r .~ Assuming v a l i d i e l a y is the name for these requirements, our specification is as folIows:6 (Rptr satisfies validrelay) [ We split v a l i d i e l a y s p e c into two pieces: one when Rptr has successfully terminated (i.e., t i c k is the last event of Rptr's trace) and one when it has not. Traces of Rptr that end with t i c k must satisfy Rptr's post condition; traces of Rptr that do not end with t i c k must satisfy Rptr's invariant. This forms a natural partition of v a l i d s e l a y since we can say more about the requirements of Rptr when it has terminated. At termination we can say that all even parity characters received by Rptr before the buffer overflows have been successfully transmitted. Before termination, all we can say is that some prefix of those characters have been transmitted. Henceforth, the phrase valid characters refers only to those characters of even parity received before an overflow.8 5The repeater's critical requirements were described informally in Section 4.
'The predicate iscomm holds if its argument is a CSP communication event. P s a t S holds if process P satisfies trace specification S. Viewing process P as the set of traces in which P may engage and S as the set of acceptable traces, the s a t predicate is equivalent to the subset predicate, i.e., process P may engage only in traces allowed by S.
7The parameter a represents the alphabet of all possible repeater events; a-* represents all possible traces formed from these events.
'outbit is the name of the repeater's output port; i n b i t is the name of the input port. then (All valid characters were transmitted over outelse ( A subsequence of valid characters were transmitend if bit) [ll] ted over outbit) [22] end valid-relay-spec; This macro is invoked in definitions 219 and 221.
( Rp t r terminates) [lo] not null tri and last(tr1) = tick This macro is invoked in definition 9
Repeater Post Condition
Under the assumption that Rptr has terminated, the three critical requirements taken together relquire that up to the point at which an overflow occurs, the output stream of characters must be identical to the input stream of characters with characters of odd parity removed. Also, nothing other than identifiable and complete characters may be transmitted over o u t b i t .
(All valid characters were transmitted over outbit) [ll] This macro is invoked in definition 9.
